maxims is the Golden Rule. Dihle found the earliest witness to it in Herodotus's use of a sophist maxim and postulated that it passed into Judaism only through Hellenistic influence in the second century. As a form of retribution theory he found it incompatible with Jesus' teaching of self-emptying love. Dihle took the poieite of Matthew 7:12 and Luke 6:31 as an indicative, expressing the current synagogue morality which the disciples were practicing. Jesus corrects them in Luke 6: 32-36.
Although subsequent scholars have challenged Dihle's conclusions about the incidence of the Golden Rule in pre-Christian literature and its place in Jesus' teaching, Dihle's conceptual framework still dominates the study of the Golden Rule. 7 Consequently, a remarkable degree of confusion still dogs almost all aspects of study of the Golden Rule, and any discussion of the Golden Rule must investigate all three principal aspects: the thought content of the rule, its literary form, and the alleged uniqueness of Jesus' version.
THOUGHT CONTENT OF THE GOLDEN RULE
Although Dihle located the Golden Rule in the category of retribution, it really does not belong there. 8 Retribution addresses the kind and extent of sanction to be levied against the doer of a good or bad action: the lex talionis responds to injuries already done to one. The Golden Rule, however, in both its positive and negative form, is not a response to an action, but the consideration of an appropriate first action. The fact that one ponders what he or she would want others to do to him or her does not make his or her actions a response to the other's act; there is no other's act. 9 On this understanding some confusion about the Golden Rule already vanishes.
Dihle himself had made the "principle of equivalence" the middle term linking theory of retribution with the Golden Rule. 10 Although Paul Ricoeur understands the rule as an improvement on retribution insofar as the reciprocity is anticipated and the rule is addressed to intentions, dispositions, and feelings, it remains for him also an expression of the logic of equivalence, opposed to Jesus' ordinary logic of superabundance. He finds the equivalence in an anticipation that the other will respond in kind to my generous action, will "act in such a way that..." Thus both Dihle and Ricoeur understand the underlying 7 Wattles, Golden Rule, rejects Dihle's provenance of the Golden Rule and has made a number of new distinctions in its conception, but his work interprets the Golden Rule too broadly to serve as focus for future discussion. 8 The principal authors who discuss the Golden Rule under the form of reciprocity are Olivier Du Roi, La réciprocité: Essai de morale fondamentale (Paris, Epi, 1970) 31-49, and Hans Ritter, "Gegenseitigkeit," in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. J. Ritter (Basel: Schwabe, 1974) 3.119-29. 9 Both the positive and negative form of the rule leave others' prior actions totally out of account; the "re-" of retaliation is lacking.
10 Dihle, Die Goldene Regel 81-82.
motive of the Golden Rule to be do ut des ("I give in order that you may give"). 11 Ricoeur's fatal error is mistranslating Jesus' "as you wish that others would do" as "as you expect that others would do." The verb (e)thelem does not mean "expect," neither in classical nor Hellenistic Greek, nor anywhere in the New Testament! 12 Jesus' form does not anticipate a response as the intention of the Golden Rule. 13 He asks disciples to get in touch with their own desires and act accordingly for the other. Thus the underlying motive could be love of neighbor as oneself (Leviticus 19:18) ; there is no hint of a do ut des.
Werner Wolbert maintains that the context in which the Golden Rule is placed can change its meaning radically.
14 But its context in Luke's Sermon reinforces the argument that no do ut des is involved. In Luke 6:27-30 Jesus never even implies a motive for the various mandated acts of nonreciprocal love of neighbor. When he finally does explicitly enunciate a motive in 6:35-36, it is not do ut des, but its opposite, a disinterested love as imitatio Dei.
15 Therefore the context also demonstrates its nonreciprocal nature, and so, pace Dihle and Ricoeur, makes love of enemies and the Golden Rule in 6:27-36 homo geneous in their ethical motivation. 16 If the Golden Rule is not a moral 11 Ricoeur, "Golden Rule" 394-95 12 Classical Greek for "expect" is prosdokan, prosdechesthai, elpizem, perimenem, or elpesthai The last does not occur m the NT, and perimenem is found only at Acts 10 24 (meaning "to keep watch for"), but the other three verbs are used for "expect" in the NT Luke would have used elpizein if he meant "expect," for he explicitly does so in 6 34, right in the immediate context of his Golden Rule' 13 169-81, esp 170-71 In this case, the context would introduce the expectation of a do ut des which is not in the rule's explicit formulation 15 Jesus does promise a great reward in Luke 6 35b, but it is not a reciprocal one, rather the vagueness of the reward, in comparison with Luke 18 28-30 and parallels, suggests that the reward is the deep personal relations of sons and daughters of God 16 The ut m do ut des can introduce two different kinds of clauses It can introduce a purpose clause "I give in order that you may give " Thus my action is aimed at getting you to conform your action to mine, and so the motive is ultimately self-interest in the good action which you return to me The ut can also be taken as a result clause "I give, and as a result you give to me " My action could now be altruistic my generous giving to you results in your return in kind, but that was not my (primary) intent This latter action is more altruistic, but it is not as altruistic as simply loving the other as other as the sole purpose of my action This would be more like God's altruistic love, which sometimes converts the other and sometimes does not, but is freely given in either case God's own holiness as a motive for Hebrew conduct in the Holiness Code links altruism to imitatio Dei just as does the Golden Rule in Luke 6 27-36 maxim of mitigated retribution, what then is it? It is a moral maxim of general altruism expressed by mutuality between a doer and others.
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LOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FORM
The Golden Rule is said to exist in two literary forms, the positive ("What you want others to do to you, so do to them") and the negative ("What you do not want others to do to you, do not do to others"). Although a few exegetes have asserted the radical superiority of the positive formulation, 18 some prestigious interpreters have asserted that there is no difference between the two forms.
19
I have a series of four Venn diagrams which demonstrate that the two formulations are not formally equivalent in the Aristotelian logic of inclusion. However, formal logicians want to analyze the two propositions in the contemporary logic of exclusion which is extremely intricate and beyond the scope of this article.
Fortunately, however, it is the material analysis of their contents which shows that the positive formulation is radically different from the negative one. The positive form has greater extension and higher quality of actions and desires than does the negative formulation. Consequently, for the remainder of this article, I adopt the scholarly convention of referring to the negative formulation as the Silver Rule.
Extension
The positive formulation governs a greater range of actions than does the negative. This can be seen by analyzing the following two principles: (1) The principle of non-maleficence: one ought not to inflict evil or harm. 20 This general principle underlies the Silver Rule and is operative in all prohibitions of injuries. Note, however, that it prohibits an action; it neither commands nor recommends any positive action which an ethical agent ought to undertake. (2) The principle of beneficence: one ought to do that which benefits. This principle commands all positive, beneficial, actions. It is the general principle underlying the 20 This is a principle that all ethicists accept, because denying it removes one from the realm of any ethical discourse.
Golden Rule, and it governs three different types of actions: (a) one ought to prevent evil or harm, e.g., not only by not doing it oneself ( = the principle of non-maleficence) but by interposing oneself between the one harming and any victims of an injurious action; (b) one ought to remove the cause of evil or harm, e.g., by legislation or individual action to combat exploitative business practices or epidemic disease; (c) one ought to do the good positively: on the level of basic duty, by acting justly, and on the level of heroic charity, by forgiving the same offense for the seventh time, or even "laying down one's life" for the other, even the enemy. Now it is clear that the Silver Rule does not cover actions described in (a), (b), or (c). "Do not do unto others what you do not want done to yourself does not obligate the Good Samaritan. 21 The Golden Rule does obligate him, for we all wish that others will put aside prejudices to treat our wounds (b) and to pay for our care in an inn (c). Further, we wish this positive action of succoring us in our great need even when it entails considerable inconvenience or even temporary suffering on the part of the other. Thus it is clear that the Golden Rule places greater demands on one's conduct than does the Silver Rule. The two forms may be logically consistent, but they are not equivalent.
Quality
The actions mandated by Jesus' Golden Rule are not merely more extensive than those mandated by the Silver Rule, but they enter into the limitlessness of human desire that is oriented towards the infinite love of God. Thus humans desire not merely material benefits, maintaining and ameliorating physical existence, but the whole range of actions which build a human community where the love of God is present and active, that is, the whole range of extraordinarily loving actions described in the Sermon on the Plain. 22 In short, the Golden Rule opens human moral obligation to the deepest human thirst for God's self-giving love toward his creatures, far beyond the kinds of actions that can be mandated by any natural or positive law, or even by the divinely revealed Mosaic Law. It embodies the most radical altruism.
To summarize, then, the formal and material characteristics of Jesus' formulation of the Golden Rule, it is (1) a general moral maxim, 23 21 One could say that the Silver Rule obligates the Good Samaritan not to pass by the beaten and robbed man, for this would be to do to him what he would not want done to himself. But when one asks what the Good Samaritan should do once he stops, then one is into a range of positive actions (binding up his wounds, taking him to an inn) which are not mandated by the Silver Rule, but only by the positive wishes of the Golden Rule.
22 See Friedrich Hauck, Evangelium des Lukas (Leipzig: Deichert, 1934) 434; W.
Grundmann, Das Evangelium nach Lukas 149.
23 It is not addressed to a specific situation, such as the correct political conduct of a ruler, or how to raise one's children.
an imperative addressed to the wide spectrum of humanity, 24 (2) whose close formal mutuality between subjects and indirect objects of the same verbs expresses a common human dignity and worth, 25 and (3) whose positive form, beginning from the desires of the human heart, opens to those desires' reach for the infinite; (4) thus its context is neither a reactive (retaliation) nor anticipated (do ut des) reciprocity of benefits or injuries, but a general altruism (grounded in God's own altruistic behavior and the Christian vocation of sons and daughters of that God).
ORIGIN OF THE GOLDEN RULE
Among most exegetes it has become commonplace that the Golden Rule as a general moral maxim existed before Jesus, not only in the negative form, but also in the positive formulation.
26 Now that we have defined its form more precisely, a careful survey of the texts usually cited as predecessors of Jesus' usage does not support this contention. What emerges rather is the originality of his positive formulation.
Eastern Texts 27
Confucius (sixth century B.c.) proclaimed shu as the moral rule for all human life and exemplified it by the Silver Rule, "What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." 28 Although shu can mean "reciprocity," Confucius explains it not in the sense of a response to another's action, but in the sense of "fellow feeling" or "mutual consideration," coming from the initiative of the ethical person.
29 Confucius has, in its negative formulation, a moral maxim of altruism, but it is not general, for he does not, as does Jesus, apply this shu to enemies, but only to friends.
30
The Taoist tradition with which Confucius was in dialogue did not come to written expression in the Tao Te Ching until the fourth century B.C. There the principle of wu-wei 31 has been translated as "To those who are good to me I am good; and to those who are not good to me I am also good-and thus all get to be good."
32 This may be a form of do ut des, but "all get to be good" may go beyond reciprocity, to an altruistic desire for the conversion of those who have treated me wrongly. However, more modern versions have translated the passage as "Those who are good I treat as good. Those who are not good I also treat as good. In so doing I gain in goodness." 33 This Taoist thought has love of enemies but it is not altruistic, nor does it have the form of a maxim. Thus Confucius has the form of the Silver Rule, but lacks its universality; the Taoists have neither the altruism nor the generalmoral-maxim form of the Golden Rule.
Greco-Roman Texts
Greco-Roman texts have been the ones most frequently adduced as antecedents of Jesus' usage, 34 but they are no nearer to Jesus' Golden Rule than are the Eastern texts. I will treat them here in the order in which they most closely approximate Jesus' form.
(1) Some of these texts are examples of retribution, or strict reciprocity, not of altruism, as Xenophon Cyropaedia 6.1.47: "To pay a debt of gratitude, try to be to him what he has been to you." This is an example of perfect specific reciprocity, responding to the prior act of another. Seneca Epistula 94.43, "Expect from another what you have done to another," reverses the order of the specific reciprocity, so that one should expect of the other what one has already done.
35
(2) Some of these texts lack the form of mutuality, as Isocrates To 30 Confucius did not accept the Taoist rule of returning good for evil. When someone asked him, "What do you think of repaying evil with kindness," he answered, "Then what are you going to repay kindness with? . . . Repay kindness with kindness, but repay evil with justice" (Analect 7.17, in Lin Yutang, ed., The Wisdom of China and India [New York: Random House, 1942] 817). 31 The Tao means "the way to go," based on the harmonious way of the universe; wu-wei means "non-meddling action" which does not interfere with Tao. 34 Dihle, Die Goldene Regel, gives an exhaustive list of the passages cited by his predecessors. John Nolland has winnowed these occurrences down to the 19 closest parallels in the Greco-Roman world (Luke 1-9:20 [Dallas: Word, 1989 ] 298). 35 Exegetes often list Publilius Syrus, Sententiae 2 as another antecedent, not noting that it is verbatim the maxim which Seneca consciously quotes in Epistula 94.
Nicoclem 38, "Whatever advice you would give your children, follow it yourself." This speaks of consistency in action, but not of mutuality between the actions of parents and children. 36 The same is true of the frequently cited To Nicoclem 49, "You should be such in your dealings with others as you expect me to be in my dealings with you." Here the mutuality is not between the officials and their subjects, but a threeway relationship between king, officials, and those subject to them.
37
Even Seneca's highest precept, Epistula 47.11, "So live with an inferior as you would want a superior to live with you," has a three-fold relationship between the self, one's inferiors, and one's superiors. This is not a cavil. The altruistic form of mutuality would stress treating my inferiors as my equals. Seneca's lack of mutuality hides the fact that I can treat my inferiors with condescending kindness, which may be as much as I can expect from my superiors. Thus, lack of mutuality reveals that none of these examples really deals with the desires of the subject or the indirect object as the desires of brothers or sisters.
(3) Some of them lack the form of a maxim, as Ovid Ex Ponto 3.1.71, "What I would myself supply were I stronger than you, that grant to me, since you are yourself the stronger." This expresses a kind of altruistic mutuality, but not in the form of a maxim. As such, it expresses admirable conduct, but has not reached a generalizable and obligatory human root of its motivation. 38 Further, this quotation expresses a reciprocity measured by the projected conduct of the requester, a kind of da quod darem, "give what I would give." (4) Some of them lack the form of generalization. Dihle's earliest examples of the Golden Rule (Herodotus 3.142; 7.136) are actually practical principles of a ruler's political policy, not maxims of general moral application.
39 Further, they are examples of the Silver Rule, and so fall short of Jesus' Golden Rule in respect of the principle of benevolence. 39 See Harvey's review of Dihle (n. 13 above), which says that at most these describe "a moral convention applying to rulers." Indeed Maenandrius's "I will not myself do that which I account blameworthy in my neighbor" (3.142) soon succumbs to practical expediency when he has to imprison those who oppose his milder rule.
(5) That leaves one Greek text as a general moral maxim of altruism, but expressed negatively, "Do not do to others what angers you when they do it to you" (Isocrates, Ad Nicoclem 61), and one Latin text which expresses the Golden Rule positively, "Let us so give as we would wish to receive" (Seneca, De beneficiis 2.1.1). But "let us give" limits the mutuality of action to giving, rather than to ruling, forgiving, etc.
40
Thus we can see one example of the Golden Rule in Greco-Roman literature contemporaneous with Jesus, but none of the examples adduced express in a general moral maxim the perfect mutuality and altruism of Jesus' Golden Rule.
Jewish Literature
Leviticus 19:18 lays down the law of altruistic love of one's covenant partner in Israel, but Dihle is correct that the formal rule does not appear in Israel until Hellenistic times. Then we have four approximations of the Silver Rule.
In the third century B.c., The Letter ofAristeas 207 gives the Jewish response to Ptolemy IFs question about wisdom: "Insofar as you do not wish evils to come upon you, but to partake of every blessing, (it would be wisdom) if you put this into practice with your subjects, including the wrongdoers . . ." This form does not have the identity of verbs, but, like Jesus' own form, it begins with the desires of the subject and it applies benevolence even to wrongdoers. From the same period comes the perfect form of the Silver Rule in Tobit 4:15, "And what you hate, do not do to anyone." Here is a general altruistic moral maxim; the mutuality of the members is implicit, but real. 42 Contemporaneous with Jesus and the formation of the synoptic tradition is Philo's Hypothetica (preserved in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 8.7.6), "Moreover it is ordained in the laws themselves that no one shall do to his neighbor what he would be unwilling to have done to himself," an expression of the Silver Rule. Perhaps also contemporaneous with Jesus is Hillel's classic formulation of the negative form, "What is hateful to you, do not do to anyone else; that is the whole Law, all else is commentary. Go and learn." 43 Thus quite clear forms of the Silver Rule
